Prologue (G. Bamberg and K. Spremann)
Section 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing
Agent and Principal (D. Spremann)
Managerial Contracting with Public and Private Information (H. Milde)
Risk Sharing and Subcontracting (G. Bamberg)
Section 2. Information and Incentives
Information Systems for Principal-Agent Problems (V. Firchau)
Information Systems and the Design of Optimal Contracts
Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for the Allocation of Public
Incentives to Forecast Honestly (A. Pfingsten)
Section 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard
Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An Overview of the Issues
The Liquidation Decision as a Principal-Agent Problem
On Stakeholders`Unanimity (J. E. M. Wilhelm)
Section 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends
Signalling and Market Behavior (A. Gruber)
Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information
Why Leasing? An Introduction to Comparative Contractual
Section 5. External Accounting and Auditing
The Financial Theory of Agency as a Tool for an Analysis of Problems in External Accounting (R. Ewert)
Asymmetric Information between Investors and Managers under the New German Accounting Legislation (F. Fricke)
Auditing in an Agency Setting (W. Ballwieser)
Investigation Strategies with Costly Perfect Information (A. Wagenhofer)
Section 6. Coordination in Groups
Managers as Principals and Agents (M. J. Beckmann)
Misperceptions, Equilibrium, and Incentives in Groups and Organizations (M. Gaynor and P. R. Kleindorfer)
Intertemporal Sharecropping: A Differential Game Approach
Section 7. Property Rights and Fairness
Mangerialism versus the Property Rights Theory of the Firm (T. Kaulmann)
Contract, Agency, and the Delegation of Decision Making (E. Schanze
A Note on Fair Equality of Rules (J. Voeller)
Section 8. Agency Costs
Agency Costs and Transaction Costs: Flops in the Principal-Agent-Theory of Financial Markets
Agency Costs are not a "Flop"! (R. H. Schmidt)
About Contributors
Author Index
Subject Index
